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Abstract
One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inher-
ent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, whether polynomial-time
truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions are provably weaker in terms of approximation ratio
than non-truthful ones. This question was very recently answered for universally truthful mechanisms
for combinatorial auctions [4], and even for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms [12]. However, both of
these results are based on information-theoretic arguments for valuations given by a value oracle, and
leave open the possibility of polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for succinctly described classes of
valuations.
This paper is the first to prove computational hardness results for truthful mechanisms for combinato-
rial auctions with succinctly described valuations. We prove that there is a class of succinctly represented
submodular valuations for which no deterministic truthful mechanism provides an m1/2−ǫ-approximation
for a constant ǫ > 0, unless NP = RP (m denotes the number of items). Furthermore, we prove that even
truthful-in-expectation mechanisms cannot approximate combinatorial auctions with certain succinctly
described submodular valuations better than within nγ , where n is the number of bidders and γ > 0
some absolute constant, unless NP ⊆ P/poly. In addition, we prove computational hardness results for
two related problems.
1 Introduction
Is it possible to design truthful polynomial-time mechanisms that achieve a good approximation ratio? This
is one of the basic questions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. The focus of most of the work on this
question is on settings in which on one hand there exists a truthful algorithm that maximizes the social
welfare (VCG), but on the other hand computing the optimal solution is computationally intractable. The
goal is therefore to determine whether there exist truthful polynomial time mechanisms that guarantee good
approximation ratios. Several settings were considered in the literature, but the flagship challenge is to
design polynomial-time truthful approximation mechanisms for the problem of combinatorial auctions.
In a combinatorial auction, we want to sell m items to n bidders with valuation functions vi : 2
[m] → R+.
As usual, we assume that vi(∅) = 0 and that vi is monotone, i.e. vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) whenever S ⊂ T . The
goal is to design a mechanism that allocates disjoint sets S1, . . . , Sn to the n bidders, optimizing (at least
approximately) the social welfare
∑n
i=1 vi(Si), in a way that incentivizes the bidders to report their true
valuations (the property of incentive-compatibility, or truthfulness). This is done by charging payments
p1, . . . , pn by the mechanism, so that for each player, reporting his true valuation maximizes the profit
vi(Si) − pi (in the case of truthfulness in expectation, the reporting the true valuation maximizes the
expectation of this expression).
Without the requirement of truthfulness, combinatorial auctions admit constant-factor approximation
algorithms for various non-trivial classes of valuations functions, in particular for submodular valuations:
A valuation v is called submodular if for each S and T we have that v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ).
Combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations admit a (1−1/e)-approximation [21] and it is also known
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that this approximation is optimal [16]. On the other hand, the VCG mechanism is truthful and provides
optimal social welfare, but naturally is not computationally efficient. Therefore, submodular valuations form
a natural setting to investigate the question whether truthfulness can be reconciled with polynomial-time
approximation or not.
The best known polynomial time truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valu-
ations achieves a factor of O(
√
m) [8]. This is quite a poor ratio indeed, but there was hope that one can
significantly improve over it. Indeed, for a variety of other interesting settings good truthful mechanisms do
exist. For example, if bidders still have submodular valuations but are able to answer the more complicated
demand queries, a randomized truthful O(logm log logm)-approximation mechanism exists [3], a powerful
construction of [18] yields optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for many settings, and very recently
[11] gave VCG-based truthful-in-expectation (1−1/e)-approximation mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
with explicit coverage valuations (and more general valuations in a certain oracle model). This and related
results raised hopes that truthfulness (or at least truthfulness-in-expectation) might be reconcilable with
computational efficiency.
On the negative side, it was proved first that any universally truthful VCG-based (a.k.a. maximal in
range) mechanism that achieves an m1/6−ǫ-approximation for submodular valuations requires exponential
communication [6]. Still, this result did not rule out the possibility of a different, non-VCG mechanism,
and it also did not address the possibility of truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. Only recently, [4] proved
that if a deterministic truthful or universally truthful mechanism can access the valuations only through
value queries (given S, what is v(S)?) and guarantees an approximation ratio of m1/2−ǫ, for any constant
ǫ > 0, then it must make exponentially many value queries. Moreover, [12] proved that even truthful-in-
expectation mechanisms that provide an approximation ratio better than mγ , for some constant γ > 0,
require exponentially many value queries.
The skeptical reader may wonder now whether these results [4, 12] are a symptom of the value oracle
model, and whether they just reflect an informational bottleneck: value oracles are too weak for transferring
sufficient information from the bidders to the mechanism. One may further argue that when bidders are
required to provide a succinct explicit description of their valuation, in some agreed-upon bidding language,
these informational bottlenecks disappear. Consequently, good computationally efficient mechanisms may
exist.
In some domains, like multi-unit auctions where all items are allocated [17] and combinatorial public
projects [20], the hardness of deterministic truthful polynomial time algorithms for succinct valuations with
good approximation ratios is already known. However, their technique does not seem to be applicable to
combinatorial auctions or any other auction domain. The reason is that both papers use the characterize-
and-optimize approach: they first characterize the truthful mechanisms in the domain, showing them to
be VCG-based, and then show that computationally-efficient VCG-based mechanisms do not provide good
approximation ratios, under plausible complexity assumptions. The characterization step in these papers
heavily relies on the fact that the domains exhibit strong forms of externalities between the bidders. Com-
binatorial auctions, and auction domains in general, are different since the value of a bidder depends only
on the bundle he receives. Recently a characterization of “scalable” two-player multi-unit auctions was
obtained in [7], but even there the additional assumption of scalability is needed, and it is not clear if we
can extend it to more than two players and submodular valuations. Furthermore, no characterizations of
truthful-in-expectation mechanisms are known at all, and such characterizations are currently beyond the
reach of our techniques, even for relatively simple domains that do exhibit strong externalities.
The only negative result for combinatorial auctions with succinct valuations so far has been [1]. There,
building on the work of [20], it is proved that any universally truthful VCG-based mechanism that achieves a
m1/2−ǫ-approximation for budget-additive valuations (and some other natural, succinctly represented classes
of valuations) would imply NP ⊆ P/poly 1. But just as previously in the information-theoretic setting, the
question of the existence of a non-VCG based mechanism, or even a VCG-based truthful-in-expectation
1For succinct representations, the only barrier to designing a truthful mechanism is computational complexity, since with
unbounded computational power, the truthful VCG mechanism provides an optimal solution. Thus any negative results in this
setting will likely depend on complexity-theoretic assumptions.
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(MIDR) mechanism, remained open. Recall that such mechanisms are known to give non-trivial results -
see above. Thus the question still remained, whether truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with
succinctly represented valuations are in principle less powerful than non-truthful ones.
In this paper we give a definite answer to this question, and show that unless NP ⊆ P/poly, there
are no truthful polynomial-time constant-factor approximation mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with
succinctly represented submodular valuations (while there is a known (1 − 1/e)-approximation for such
valuations without truthfulness). This result rules out even truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. This is
the first separation in terms of computational complexity between truthful and non-truthful mechanisms for
combinatorial auctions. For deterministic mechanisms, our result is even stronger: we prove a tight m1/2−ǫ
hardness factor. In other words, even if able to bypass the information bottleneck, the auctioneer will face
an equally hard barrier to pass: the computational one.
Our main results All of our results hold for succinctly represented valuations, in particular succinctly
represented submodular valuations. We say that a class C of valuation functions v : 2[m] → R+ is suc-
cinctly represented by an encoding ν, if for each v ∈ C, ν(v) is a bit string of size polynomial in m and
there is a procedure that, given ν(v) and S ⊆ [m], computes v(S) in time polynomial in m. Examples
of succinctly represented functions that where studied in the literature include budget additive valuations,
coverage valuations, and XOS (with polynomially many clauses). See, e.g., [19].
Our two main results are for combinatorial auctions:
• We prove that there is a class of succinctly represented submodular valuations for which no deterministic
truthful mechanism provides an m1/2−ǫ-approximation for a constant ǫ > 0, unless NP = RP .
• We prove that there is a constant γ > 0 such that for any constant number of bidders n, there is a
class of succinctly represented submodular valuations for which no randomized truthful-in-expectation
mechanism achieves a nγ-approximation, unless NP ⊆ P/poly.
Results for other domains We complement our main results with two additional impossibilities for other
domains: combinatorial public projects and multi-unit auctions.
In a combinatorial public project, a single set S should be chosen for n bidders with valuation functions
vi, maximizing
∑n
i=1 vi(S) under the constraint that |S| = k.
• We prove that for combinatorial public projects with coverage valuations, there is no constant-factor
truthful-in-expectation mechanism, unless NP ⊆ P/poly.
We remark that it was already known that combinatorial public projects with coverage valuations do not
admit any deterministic truthful mechanism with approximation better than m1/2−ǫ [2]. On the other hand,
the problem of flexible combinatorial public projects, where the constraint |S| = k is replaced by |S| ≤ k,
does admit a truthful-in-expectation (1− 1/e)-approximation for coverage valuations [10]. Thus we prove a
separation between flexible (|S| ≤ k) and exact (|S| = k) combinatorial public projects.
We prove a related separation in the domain of multi-unit auctions. In [5] it is shown that there exists
a polynomial time truthful-in-expectation FPTAS for multi-unit auctions. This mechanism is maximal
in distributional range (MIDR). It is also shown there that no polynomial time truthful-in-expectation
mechanism for two players in the oracle model can provide an approximation ratio better than 2, if all items
are allocated. We complement this result by showing that no polynomial-time MIDR mechanism for two
players with succintly described valuations achieves an approximation ratio better than 2, unless RP = NP .
A word on our techniques This paper builds on advances developed in a sequence of recent papers
[4, 12, 9]. Our proofs for combinatorial auctions are obtained by considering the previously developed proofs
in the value oracle model [4, 12], and converting them into computational hardness proofs in the following
manner: The proofs in [4, 12] depend on a certain “hidden set” which is hard to find by value queries. In
our new proofs, the hidden set in both cases is represented implicitly as a solution to some computationally
3
difficult problem (e.g. SAT). However, some new difficulties arise when trying incorporate this idea in the
proof of hardness for truthful mechanisms.
In the case of deterministic truthful mechanisms, the construction of the valuation function in [4] itself
depends on the properties of the presumed mechanism, namely on its pricing scheme. We resolve this issue
by incorporating a component in the representation of a valuation that allows us to feed a description of the
presumed mechanism itself into the valuation, thus obtaining a contradiction by a diagonalization argument.
In the case of truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, the location of the hidden set affects the valuation
function more substantially than just the value of a single set. We need a more sophisticated encoding to
be able to evaluate the function efficiently. We appeal to the encoding of submodular functions using list-
decodable codes which was used recently in [9] to obtain inapproximability results for submodular optimization
problems. Using list-decodable codes, we are able to encode our valuations in a way that simultaneously
allows the flexibility of a “hidden set” described implicitly by a computationally difficult problem, and
efficient evaluation. An additional technical difficulty in this proof is the presence of certain parameters
necessary for a reduction, whose existence is proved non-constructively in [12]. We have to make sure
that these parameters can be described by a polynomial-size advice string (leading to the conclusion that
NP ⊆ P/poly).
Our hardness result for combinatorial public projects is more direct, appealing to the technical properties
of Feige’s reduction for the hardness of Max-k-cover [14]. We use the known fact that combinatorial public
projects with 1 bidder essentially have to maximize over a certain range of distributions [12], and using the
structure of Feige’s reduction, we obtain a contradiction with the hardness of finding good solutions for the
Max-k-cover problem.
An interesting feature of all our proofs is that they do not rely on the Sauer-Shelah lemma or VC-
dimension, which played an important role in previous computational hardness results for combinatorial
public projects and combinatorial auctions [20, 1, 2]. One reason for this is that in the case of truthful-
in-expectation mechanisms, it is not clear how VC-dimension should be used at all - the range of possible
distributions output by the mechanism is a continuum which does not lend itself to combinatorial analysis
such as VC-dimension. But even in our proof for deterministic mechanisms, we do not appeal to the
Sauer-Shelah lemma. Rather, we design the representation of a valuation function in a way that allows the
embedding of a computationally hard problem, and yet admits efficient evaluation of the function.
Open questions We leave several interesting questions for future work. First, in the bidding languages we
use to prove the hardness of combinatorial auctions, answering demand queries is NP-hard. Can one prove an
analogous hardness result for bidding languages in which demand queries can be answered efficiently? This
seems to be a challenging question that requires substantial extensions of our techniques. For example, with
demand queries it is possible to achieve a logarithmic approximation via a universally truthful mechanism,
which beats the bounds we give. Another question is to prove impossibility results for specific bidding
languages, like budget-additive, coverage, and XOS.
2 Deterministic Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
Our first proof is about the impossibility of deterministic truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
with submodular bidders. In [4] it is shown that any deterministic truthful mechanism for combinatorial
auctions with submodular bidders that provides an approximation ratio better than m
1
2 makes exponentially
many value queries. This is proven using a direct hardness approach. The following theorem (non trivially)
extends this approach and shows how to obtain impossibilities that are based on computational complexity.
Theorem 2.1. There is a class C of succinctly represented monotone submodular valuations, such that if
there is a deterministic truthful polynomial-time mechanism for combinatorial auctions with valuations in C
that guarantees an approximation ratio of m1/2−ǫ, for any fixed ǫ > 0, then NP = RP .
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Proof sketch We show that if a truthful algorithm provides a good approximation, then there must exist
a player i and valuations v−i such that there exists a submenu of the menu induced by v−i that is not only
large but also has a some specific structure. Then we show that for certain valuations of player i, finding a
profit maximizing bundle (which is a must for a truthful mechanism according to the taxation principle) is
computationally hard, and allows one to solve the SAT problem by reduction.
The first part of the reduction is to find the valuations v−i that induce a large, structured menu for
player i. This is done by showing that a set of random “polar additive” valuations induce a menu with
the required structure with high probability. The second part is the optimization part, in which we present
valuations vi for which finding the bundle that maximizes the profit is computationally hard. In [4] this
is done by constructing a generic family of valuations using the properties of the structured menu induced
by v−i, and choosing a specific valuation by giving a bonus to one particular bundle (the intended profit
maximizing bundle). However, in this paper we work with succinctly described valuations, i.e. each valuation
should have a polynomial-size description which allows one to evaluate the function efficiently. This causes
an extra layer of complication: not only that the structured menu depends on the truthful mechanism itself
and the valuations of the other players, we cannot even explicitly describe it, since is exponentially large. To
overcome this obstacle, we use a “diagonalization argument”: the description of a valuation vi involves the
description of an algorithm (or a circuit) that verifies whether a given set S is in the structured menu and
computes the correct value vi(S). Eventually, we feed a circuit describing the presumed mechanism itself
into the valuation.
We also have to specify succinctly the special profit-maximizing bundle, so that finding it is computa-
tionally hard. We do that in two steps. First, we choose some random projection of every bundle in the
structured submenu to {0, 1}ℓ, where ℓ = poly{n,m}. Next, we would like to specify some special strings
in {0, 1}ℓ such that bundles in the structured menu that are projected to the special strings will be the
profit-maximizing bundles. Of course, if we just specify the special strings in the straightforward way, it
might be easy for an algorithm to efficiently find the profit-maximizing bundle. Therefore, we specify the
special strings to be the satisfying assignments of a SAT instance, which completes our reduction.
To summarize, we randomly construct valuations v−i, and we show that with some constant probability
the v−i induce an exponentially large structured submenu. We then construct a valuation vi of the i’th player
based on this structured submenu; we use a decription of the mechanism itself to do so. The profit-maximizing
bundles of vi will be exactly all bundles that are (randomly) projected to a satisfying assignment of the
formula. We will show that with inverse-polynomial probability the construction of the random valuations
succeeds and the random projection indeed maps a bundle in the menu to a satisfying assignment, and in
this case a truthful algorithm must find a solution to the SAT instance. This will show that the existence of
a truthful mechanism as in the theorem implies NP = RP .
2.1 The Bidding Language
We start the proof by specifying the bidding language that we use, i.e. the class of valuations and their
representation on the input.
Additive valuations Our class of valuations includes the set of all additive valuations: for each bundle S,
v(S) = Σj∈Sv({j}). We may use any natural representation of additive valuation to do that. In particular,
the proof uses a certain type of additive valuations called polar additive valuations. These are additive
valuations such that for each item j either v({j}) = 1 or v({j}) = 1m3 . We sometimes use random polar
additive valuations. As the name suggests, these are polar additive valuations in which the value of each
item j is set independently at random vi(j) = 1 with probability p =
1
n , or vi(j) =
1
m3 with probability
1− p.
Bonus valuations In addition, the bidding language is able to express the following bonus valuations.
Each bonus valuations is parameterized by four parameters: t, k, P (·), B(·), where t, k are non-negative
numbers, B : 2M → {0, 1} is a boolean function and P : 2M → {0, 1} is a monotone boolean function, both
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described by polynomial-size circuits. Hence, the complete representation (t, k, P,B) of a bonus valuations
takes polynomial space. Given these parameters, the following valuation v is a bonus valuation:
v(S) =


|S| · t, if |S| < k;
(k − 1
2|S|
) · t, if |S| ≥ k and P (S) = 0
k · t− 1m4 , if |S| = k, P (S) = 1 and B(S) = 0;
k · t, if |S| = k, P (S) = 1 and B(S) = 1;
k · t, if |S| > k and P (S) = 1.
Notice that computing the value v(S) for a given bundle S (that is, implementing value queries) for
bonus valuations can be done in polynomial time, given the representation above. Also, similar to [4], it
can be verified that v(S) is a monotone submodular function for any boolean function B : 2M → {0, 1} and
monotone P : 2M → {0, 1}.
The definition of the bonus function is similar but not identical to the one in [4]. To assist the reader
who is familiar with the proof in [4], here is how the specific functions P (·) and B(·) that we choose later will
roughly correspond to the construction in [4]: For sets of size k, the function P (S) describes the “structured
menu”, by giving value 1 to bundles in the structured menu and 0 otherwise. It also specifies the bundles
that are larger and more expensive than the bundles in the structured menu, by giving value 1 to them.
Among the bundles in the structured menu, the function B(·) picks the bonus bundles by giving value 1.
2.2 The Reduction
Our goal is to solve a SAT instance, using the presumed truthful mechanism. Recall the following concept
from [4]: Rv−i is the menu induced by v−i, i.e. the collection of all possible sets that could be allocated to
bidder i, assuming that the (n− 1)-tuple of valuations of other bidders is v−i. If a set S ∈ Rv−i is allocated
to bidder i, he is charged a price pv−i(S) that does not depend on his own declared valuation (the “taxation
principle”). Some sets are not on the menu, but for convenience we extend the definition of pv−i(S) to
S /∈ Rv−i , by setting pv−i(S) := minT∈Rv−i :S⊂T pv−i(T ). If there no superset of S on the menu, we define
pv−i(S) =∞.
Definition 2.2 (Structured Submenu). Given valuations v−i of all bidders i
′ 6= i, and parameters k, p ∈
[0,m], the structured submenu S(v−i, k, p) is the collection of all sets if items S such that
• S ∈ Rv−i ,
• |S| = k,
• p− 1m5 < pv−i(S) ≤ p,
• for all T ∈ Rv−i such that T strictly contains S, pv−i(T )− pv−i(S) ≥ 1m3 .
We call a bundle S a candidate, if it satisfies the conditions above (i.e. S ∈ S(v−i, k, p), when S(v−i, k, p)
will be clear from the context).
Lemma 2.3 (essentially from [4]). Let A be a (deterministic) truthful n10 -approximation mechanism for
combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations. Let v−i be a set of valuations where each valuation in
v−i is a random polar additive valuation (with m/n items of value 1). Then, with a constant probability,
there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and p ∈ [0,m] (a multiple of 1/m5) such that |S(v−i, k, p)| ≥ e
m
n2
10n2·m6 .
In [4] only the existence of such a structured menu was proven. However, it is easy to see that the proof
of [4] actually shows that this event occurs with constant probability as well. Specifically, the proof works as
follows: we select at random a player i and construct random polar additive valuations for all other players.
Then, with constant probability there are parameters p and k such that the respective structured submenu
is sufficiently large.
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In our construction we need to find k and p in polynomial time. We do that as follows. Observing that k
can be one of m possible values 1, . . . ,m and that p can be one of m6 values 1m5 ,
2
m5 , . . . ,m, we notice that
number of possible combinations of values for p and k is polynomially bounded. Therefore we can try each
combination one by one. The rest of the analysis assumes that the values of k, p and the random coins are
successful in the sense that the structured submenu S(v−i, p, k) has cardinality at least e
m
n2
10n2·m6 .
Next, we set up a bonus valuation for bidder i that will allow us to embed the SAT problem in it. We
choose the parameter t to be equal to t = 22m. The parameters k and p of the bonus valuation are identical
to the parameters k and p of the structured submenu. The following lemma describes the function Pp(·)
that we use as the P (·) parameter of the bonus valuation.
Lemma 2.4. Let A be a truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. Fix
valuations v−i for all bidders except i, and parameters k ∈ Z, p ∈ [0,m]. Let Pp(S) be the following function:
Pp(S) =


1 if |S| = k and S is a candidate (S ∈ S(v−i, k, p));
1 if |S| > k and pv−i(S) > p;
0 otherwise.
Then Pp(·) is a monotone boolean function and Pp(S) can be evaluated in time polynomial in n, m, and the
running time of A.
Proof. Let us verify that Pp(·) is a monotone function. Let S ⊂ T . If Pp(S) = 1 then one possibility is that
S is a candidate and thus by definition of a structured menu, pv−i(T ) > p. The other possibility is that
|S| > k and pv−i(S) ≥ p. Then we also have |T | ≥ |S| > k and pv−i(T ) ≥ pv−i(S) > p by the monotonicity
of the payment function pv−i . In both cases, Pp(T ) = 1.
To evaluate Pp(S), we show that we can efficiently decide whether S is a candidate and whether pv−i(S) >
p or not, using the truthful mechanism as a black box. Given a bundle S, consider the following additive
valuation v for bidder i: v({j}) = 2p if j ∈ S and v({j}) = 0 otherwise. Let S′ be the bundle allocated to i
in A(v, v−i) and let p
′ be the price that i is charged in this instance.
First, assume that |S| = k; here we want to determine whether S is a candidate. We start with showing
that if S is a candidate, then the returned bundle under valuation v must be S′ = S. To see this, recall
that if S is a candidate, then S ∈ Rv−i and pv−i(S) ≤ p, therefore the profit from S under valuation v is
v(S)− pv−i(S) ≥ 2p|S| − p. No other set can have higher profit, because supersets of S have the same value
and strictly higher price, while sets that do not contain S have value at most 2p|S| − 2p. Thus, S′ = S and
we also learn the price pv−i(S). If pv−i(S) ∈ [p− 1m4 , p], it remains to decide whether for each T that strictly
contains S, pv−i(S) +
1
m3 ≤ pv−i(T ). This can be done by altering v to another additive valuation vj which
is identical to v except that vj({j}) = 1m3 , for exactly one item j. Observe that pv−i(S) + 1m3 ≤ pv−i(T ) for
all T ) S if and only if i is allocated S in A(v−i, vj) for every j /∈ S. In this case, we conclude that S is a
candidate. If the above process fails at at point, S cannot be a candidate.
Next, we consider the case where |S| > k; here we just need to check whether pv−i(S) > p. If S′ = S then
we learn the price of S and we can immediately check whether pv−i(S) > p. Next, consider the case where
there exists some item j ∈ S\S′. Then we claim that pv−i(S) > p. To see this, observe that pv−i(S)−p′ ≥ 2p
since the marginal value of j is 2p. Since p′ is nonnegative we have that pv−i(S) ≥ 2p > p.
The last remaining case is that S ⊂ S′. Then we claim that pv−i(S) = pv−i(S′): The price function
pv−i(·) is monotone so we have that pv−i(S) ≤ pv−i(S′). Moreover, our construction of v implies that
v(S′) = v(S) and thus if pv−i(S
′) > pv−i(S) then the profit from S is larger than the profit from S
′.
But this cannot be since S is allocated to i by the (truthful) mechanism. So we can again check whether
pv−i(S) = pv−i(S
′) > p.
We now proceed to implementing the function B(·). The role of this function is to specify which candidate
bundles get a bonus. A naive way to do so would be to explicitly list the bundles that get a bonus. However,
this would make finding a profit-maximizing bundle too easy. Thus, we use an implicit way of specifying
these bundles: all bundles that correspond to a satisfying assignment of a certain SAT instance. Specifically,
given a boolean formula φ on ℓ variables, we construct a circuit for the following function B(·). We generate
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a uniformly random matrix T ∈ {0, 1}ℓ×m, which induces a linear mapping T : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ where
T (S) = T · 1S , all operations modulo 2. We let B(S) = 1 if and only if the assignment of the ℓ variables
defined by T (S) satisfies φ.
Claim 2.5. Suppose that φ is satisfiable and x ∈ {0, 1}ℓ is a satisfying assignment. If S ⊆ {0, 1}m, |S| > 22ℓ,
then with probability at least 1− 2−ℓ there exists some S ∈ S such that T (S) = x.
Proof. Let ZS denote the indicator variable of the event T (S) = x, and let Z =
∑
S∈S ZS . We can
assume that ∅ /∈ S; removing the empty set decreases |S| only by 1. Then, for any S ∈ S, we have
E[ZS ] = Pr[T (S) = x] = 2
−ℓ, since T (S) is distributed uniformly in {0, 1}ℓ. Therefore, E[Z] = 2−ℓ|S|.
Moreover, for any S 6= S′ ∈ S, we have E[ZSZS′ ] = Pr[T (S) = T (S′) = x] = 2−2ℓ. This is because
T (S′) = T (S ∩ S′) ⊕∑i∈S′\S Ti where Ti is the i-th column of T , uniformly distributed in {0, 1}ℓ and
independent of T (S) for i /∈ S. (We can assume WLOG that S′ \ S 6= ∅.) Therefore even conditioning on
T (S) = x, the probability that T (S′) = x is still 2−ℓ.
In other words, the variables ZS are pairwise independent and we can computeVar[Z] =
∑
S∈S Var[ZS ] =∑
S∈S(E[Z
2
S ]−E[ZS]2) = (2−ℓ − 2−2ℓ)|S|. By Chebyshev’s inequality,
Pr[Z = 0] ≤ Var[Z]
(E[Z])2
=
(2−ℓ − 2−2ℓ)|S|
(2−ℓ|S|)2 ≤
1
2−ℓ|S| ≤
1
2ℓ
.
Finally, we prove that if φ is satisfiable and all the random choices are successful in the sense that the
structured submenu S(v−i, k, p) is sufficiently large and the random transformation T hits the satisfying
assignment, then the mechanism must return a bundle S′ such that B(S′) = 1.
Lemma 2.6. If bidder i’s valuation v is a bonus valuation as constructed above and there exists S∗ ∈
S(v−i, k, p) such that T (S∗) is a satisfying assignment to the formula φ, then bidder i receives a bundle S′
such that B(S′) = 1.
Proof. The proof is very similar to one that can be found in [4] and follows from the following series of
claims. We fix some bundle S∗ ∈ S(v−i, k, p) such that B(S∗) = 1.
Claim 2.7. v(S∗)− pv−i(S∗) > v(S)− pv−i(S), for every S such that |S| < k or P (S) = 0.
Proof. We have v(S∗)−pv−i(S∗) ≥ kt−p ≥ kt−m. If |S| < k, then clearly v(S∗)−pv−i(S∗) > v(S)−pv−i(S),
because v(S) ≤ (k − 1)t < kt −m (since t = 22m). If |S| ≥ k and P (S) = 0, then v(S) = (k − 1/2|S|)t ≤
(k − 1/2m)t < kt−m, again because t = 22m.
Claim 2.8. v(S∗)− pv−i(S∗) > v(S)− pv−i(S), for every S such that |S| > k and P (S) = 1.
Proof. Here, v(S) ≤ kt = v(S∗). To finish the proof, observe that by definition of P (S) we have pv−i(S) >
p ≥ pv−i(S∗).
Claim 2.9. vS
∗
i (S
∗)− pv−i(S∗) > vS
∗
i (S)− pv−i(S), for every S such that |S| = k, P (S) = 1 and B(S) = 0.
Proof. Hence v(S) = kt − 1m4 , while v(S∗) = kt. By the properties of the structured submenu, |pv−i(S) −
pv−i(S
∗)| ≤ 1m5 which proves the claim.
Therefore, the only possible bundles allocated to bidder i have |S| = k, P (S) = 1 and B(S) = 1.
Now we can finish and summarize the proof of Theorem 2.1.
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Proof. Let ǫ > 0 be any positive constant. We assume that there a truthful mechanism for combinatorial
auctions with n submodular bidders and m items that achieves a n10 -approximation, when n = 10m
1/2−ǫ.
Our goal is to solve a SAT problem in which we are given a formula φ with ℓ variables.
We choose parameters n = 10m1/2−ǫ = poly(ℓ) so that e
m
n2
10n2·m6 > 2
2ℓ, and we produce an instance of
combinatorial auctions with n bidders and m items. We set t = 22m. We pick a random bidder i and random
polar additive valuations v−i for bidders i
′ 6= i. Then we try all possible values of k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and
p ∈ { 1m5 , 2m5 , . . . ,m} and we construct a bonus valuation for bidder i with these parameters. We construct a
circuit implementing the function P (·), by simulating the computation of the presumed mechanism, according
to Lemma 2.4. We also pick a random matrix T ∈ {0, 1}ℓ×m and construct a circuit implementing the
function B(·) such that B(S) = 1 if and only if T (S) satisfies φ. Then we run the mechanism on the bonus
valuation defined by (t, k, P,B) for bidder i and v−i for the remaining bidders.
If the mechanism returns a bundle S for bidder i such that B(S) = 1, we have found a satisfying
assignment T (S) to the formula φ. If not, we repeat this process polynomially many times. If the process
never succeeds, we answer that the formula is unsatisfiable. This procedure can fail only if the formula is
satisfiable, with exponentially small probability.
3 Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
In this section, we want to rule out the existence of any constant-factor truthful-in-expectation mechanism,
as opposed to deterministic and universally truthful mechanisms. In fact, the proof holds for the stronger
variant of approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanisms.
Definition 3.1. For ǫ ≥ 0, a mechanism with allocation and payment rules A and p is (1−ǫ)-approximately
truthful-in-expectation if every player (1 − ǫ)-approximately maximizes his expected utility by truthfully re-
porting his valuation function, meaning that
E[vi(A(v)) − pi(v)] ≥ (1 − ǫ)E[vi(A(v′i, v−i))− pi(v′i, v−i)]
for every player i, (true) valuation function vi, (reported) valuation function v
′
i, and (reported) valuation
functions v−i of the other players. The expectations above are over the coin flips of the mechanism.
We prove the following.
Theorem 3.2. There are absolute constants ǫ, γ > 0 such that for every fixed n, there is a class of succinctly
represented monotone submodular valuations, for which there is no n−γ-approximation truthful-in-expectation
(even (1 − ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-expectation) mechanism for combinatorial auctions with n players,
unless NP ⊂ P/poly.
The proof of this theorem builds on several recent advances and techniques that have been developed in
this area. Therefore, before we describe the proof in detail, we summarize its main components.
Proof background We start from the hardness proof in the value oracle model that was developed in
[12]. The proof of [12] is based on a density-boosting technique which implies that every mechanism for
combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders must either use an exponential number of value queries, or
we obtain a contradiction with the property of truthfulness in expectation. The contradiction is obtained
from a technical argument relying on the symmetry gap machinery of [22]. Recently, [9] proposed a generic
way of converting hardness proofs using this machinery into computational hardness proofs, for succinctly
represented submodular functions. This reduction uses list decodable codes and the known hardness of
Unique-SAT (deciding whether a formula has 0 or 1 satisfying assignments). We appeal to the same idea
here, and represent submodular valuation functions in the same format as [9].
A price that we have to pay for using the framework of [9] is that the symmetry gap argument can be
used only with parameters that lead to hardness depending on the number of players, but not the number of
items (n−γ , as opposed to m−γ). Possibly these parameters can be optimized to yield hardness with a (mild)
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dependence on m (depending on the best currently known list-decodable codes), but for ease of exposition
we restrict ourselves to ruling out n−γ-approximation in this paper.
Following the framework of [9], assuming that there exists an approximately-TIE mechanism providing
a good approximation for these succinctly represented functions, we provide a way of solving Unique-SAT
using the mechanism. The way we embed the Unique-SAT problem in an instance of combinatorial auctions
is based on the density-boosting technique of [12]. Unfortunately, the parameters describing the embedding
are algorithmically inaccessible and must be provided as an advice string. The last technical question we
have to deal with is whether these parameters can be described by a polynomially-bounded string for each
input size. This requires some additional work and modification of certain technical lemmas from [12]. In
conclusion, we show how to use the presumed mechanism to solve Unique-SAT using polynomial advice, and
this implies NP ⊂ RP/poly = P/poly.
Proof sketch Now we describe roughly how the proof works. We use repeatedly the taxation principle,
which in the case of truthful-in-expectation mechanisms says the following: For each player i, once the
valuations of the other players are fixed, the mechanism implicitly offers a menu M whose entries are
distributions over sets Si and prices pi. The menu consists of all the possible distributions that the player
could receive when reporting a certain valuation. The taxation principle (which follows directly from the
property of truthfulness) states that for each valuation vi reported by player i, the mechanism must allocate
to him the distribution from the menu that maximizes the expected utility E[vi(Si)− pi].
We start from a basic instance, as in [4], where each player i has a random desired set Ai. As was proved
in [4], the approximation guarantee implies that there is a player i whose allocation in this instance is at
least somewhat correlated with his desired set (to an extent that depends on the approximation factor). In
the following, we fix this “special player” as well as the valuations of the other players.
Next, we consider more complicated valuations for the special player, that we call “double-peak valua-
tions”. These valuations were developed in [12]. Each double-peak valuation is supported on the union of
two sets A∪B and is defined in such a way that the sets A,B have a “high value”, while sets that are evenly
split by the partition (A,B) have a lower value. The technical obstacle here is that we want to present the
valuations succinctly on the input, without explicitly revealing the partition (A,B). To achieve this, we use
the list-decoding idea of [9].
The reason why double-peak valuations are useful in proving a hardness result is quite technical. One
indication of why these functions might be useful is that the analytic transformation that is crucial in the
truthful-in-expectation mechanism for coverage functions in [11] does not work for double-peak valuation
functions. More precisely, in contrast to coverage valuations where this transformation produces a concave
function, for a double-peak valuation the resulting function is not concave. This is the starting point of the
hardness proof in the oracle model in [12]. Here, we adapt the machinery of [12] to our purpose as follows.
As in [12], we consider double-peak valuations at different “levels”, where the cardinality of the support
A ∪ B doubles at each level. We measure the “value at level j” of distributions on the menu of the special
player by the double-peak valuations supported on A ∪ B, where A,B are chosen randomly at level j. We
prove that there must be two successive levels j, j+1 where there is a relatively valuable distribution on the
menu with respect to level j, but no distribution is very valuable with respect to level j+1. This follows from
the density-boosting technique of [12]: If this were not the case, we would obtain by an inductive argument
a very valuable distribution at the last level, which would lead to a contradiction with the taxation principle.
An added difficulty here is that the notion of being valuable also incorporates prices, by way of a multiplier
λ that serves as a conversion factor between values and prices. We have to ensure that the necessary multiplier
λ can be described by polynomially many bits. This leads to some technical issues that we deal with in
this paper. In conclusion, we have a polynomial-size description of the “place to embed” a valuation, with
respect to which a valuable distribution exists on the menu, but it cannot be found if we do not know the
partition (A,B).
In fact, the way we measure value at level j + 1 corresponds to what the mechanism can achieve at
level j, if the output distribution is “balanced with respect to the partition (A,B)”. Since we make it a
computationally difficult task to find the partition (A,B), we would in fact expect the output distribution
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to be balanced with respect to (A,B). But we prove that there exists a distribution on the menu, strictly
more valuable than any that is balanced with respect to (A,B). So truthfulness in expectation implies that
the mechanism must in fact return an unbalanced distribution.
Finally, we show how to solve the Unique-SAT problem, assuming the scenario above. Using the list-
decoding idea of [9], we set up a submodular valuation encoded by a Unique-SAT formula at level j, with the
property that if the Unique-SAT formula is satisfiable, that the player should receive a relatively valuable
distribution from the mechanism. The satisfying assignment corresponds to the unknown partition (A,B)
which is not easily determined by the mechanism, given the succinct representation of the valuation. The
parameters necessary for setting up the submodular valuation cannot be all computed algorithmically, but
we ensure that for each input size n they can be described by poly(n) bits. These parameters will be given as
an advice string in the reduction. Finally, the property that there is no very valuable balanced distribution
on the menu guarantees that the mechanism must return an unbalanced distribution, in case the formula is
satisfiable. This would allow us to determine the partition (A,B) and find a satisfying assignment. Hence,
we are able to decide the Unique-SAT problem using polynomial advice, which implies that NP ⊂ P/poly.
3.1 The Bidding Language
Here, we define two classes of submodular functions along with the encoding that will be used in the hardness
proof.
Polar additive valuations The first type of function that we use (following [4]) is simple:
• vA,ω(S) = |S ∩A|+ ω|S \A|, where A is a set and ω > 0 is a positive real number.
Such functions are monotone, additive and hence also submodular. We encode them naturally by specifying
the set A and the parameter ω.
Double-peak valuations The second type of function (following [12]) is one we call “double-peak valu-
ation”, because each has two disjoint sets A,B of “high value”. The function is parameterized by disjoint
sets A,B of equal cardinality and real numbers α, β > 0. The value of fA,B,α,β(S) is defined as follows:
• Let x = |S∩A||A| and y = |S∩B||B| . Then fA,B,α,β(S) = ψ˜(x, y) where ψ˜(x, y) is defined as follows:2
• If |x− y| ≤ β, then ψ˜(x, y) = 1− (1− x+y2α )2+
• If x− y > β, then ψ˜(x, y) = 1− (1 − 2x−β2α )+(1 − 2y+β2α )+
• If y − x > β, then ψ˜(x, y) = 1− (1 − 2x+β2α )+(1 − 2y−β2α )+
We also define a “symmetrized double-peak function” f¯A∪B,α by
• f¯A∪B,α(S) = ψ˜(x+y2 , x+y2 ) = 1− (1− x+y2α )2+ where x, y are as above.
Note that f¯A∪B,α(S) does not depend on β and the partition of A∪B into A,B, which justifies our notation.
It is shown in [12] that these functions are monotone submodular. They could be encoded by specifying
the quadruple (A,B, α, β), or the pair (A ∪ B,α) in the symmetric case, but that is not the encoding we
use. Instead, we apply a more intricate encoding using list decodable codes, developed in [9]. We warn the
reader that this encoding may not look very natural. All we ask is that an encoding Υ defines a submodular
function vΥ such that given Υ and a set S, the value of vΥ(S) can be computed efficiently. In particular,
this encoding allows one to use any algorithm in the value oracle model, such as the (non-truthful) (1−1/e)-
approximation for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions [21]. In contrast, we prove that the
2 We define (x)+ = max{x, 0} to be the positive part of x. By (x)2+, we mean (max{x, 0})
2.
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requirement of truthfulness in expectation prevents one from achieving any constant-factor approximation
for the same submodular valuations.
We will need the following definition.
Definition 3.3 (List Decodable Codes). A pair of functions (E,D), E : Σm → Σn, D : Σn → (Σm)ℓ,
ℓ = poly(n) is called an (n,m, d)-list decodable code if:
1. E is injective.
2. For c ∈ Σn and x ∈ Σm, x ∈ D(c) if and only if dH(c, E(x)) ≤ d.
Here, dH denotes Hamming distance, dH(x, y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}|. In this paper we are only interested in
cases where E and D can be computed in polynomial time.
In particular, we use list decodable codes over Σ = {0, 1}, i.e. binary codes. We fix a family of binary
(m′′,m′, 12 (1 − β)m′′)-list decodable codes for all sufficiently large m′′ ∈ Z+ (over Σ = {0, 1}, with m′′ =
poly(m′) and constant β > 0; such codes are described for instance in [15]). We denote the encoding function
by E : {0, 1}m′ → {0, 1}m′′ and the decoding function by D : {0, 1}m′′ → ({0, 1}m′)ℓ. These codes are fixed
in our reduction and assumed to be implicitly described by the parameters m′, m′′ and β.
The encoding of double-peak valuations We encode a valuation function by parameters α, β > 0,
an ordered set C of cardinality |C| = 2m′′ and a boolean formula φ on m′ variables, which is assumed to
have at most one satisfying assignment. (If φ has multiple satisfying assignments, it does not encode a
submodular function and we do not assume anything about how the mechanism behaves on such input.)
Given (C, φ, α, β), we define vC,φ,α,β(S) as follows.
• If φ does not have any satisfying assignment, then we define vC,φ,α,β(S) = f¯C,α(S) (see the definition
of f¯A∪B,α above, where we set A ∪B = C, ignoring the ordering of the elements of C).
• If φ has a (unique) satisfying assignment x = (x1, . . . , xm′), let y = E(x) ∈ {0, 1}m′′. We identify the
ordered set C in some canonical way with [m′′] × {0, 1} (for example by a bijection which maps the
ordering of C to the lexicographic ordering of [m′′]×{0, 1}) and we define A by an expansion procedure
A = exp(y) as follows: If yi = 0, then (i, 0) ∈ A and (i, 1) /∈ A; if yi = 1, then (i, 0) /∈ A and (i, 1) ∈ A.
We also define B = C \A. Note that |A| = |B| = m′′. We define vC,φ,α,β(S) = fA,B,α,β(S).
We show that (C, φ, α, β) is indeed a legitimate representation of vC,φ,α,β in the sense that the function
can be evaluated efficiently, given (C, φ, α, β).
Lemma 3.4. Given (C, φ, α, β), the value of vC,φ,α,β(S) can be calculated in polynomial time for any S.
Proof. First, the value of the function depends only on the elements in C, so we might as well restrict the
ground set to C for now. We view subsets of C as strings in {0, 1}[m′′]×{0,1}; the Hamming distance dH is
then equivalent to the symmetric difference between sets. Observe that if S is balanced in the sense that
||S ∩ A| − |S ∩ B|| ≤ βm′′, we can calculate the value of vC,φ,α,β(S) without having to know the partition
C = A ∪ B, because we are in the symmetric case where the value depends only on |S ∩ C|. Therefore, we
have to show a polynomial-time procedure that finds out whether S is balanced or unbalanced and finds
the partition (A,B) in the unbalanced case. In the following we show a procedure that identifies whether
|S∩A|−|S\B| > βm′′ and in that case finds (A,B). The other case is similar (by considering the complement
of S in C).
Claim 3.5. Let S ⊆ A ∪ B, A ∩ B = ∅ and |A| = |B| = m′′. If |S ∩ A| − |S \ B| > βm′′ then dH(S,A) <
(1− β)m′′.
Proof. Using the facts that S ⊆ A ∪B, A ∩B = ∅ and |A| = m′′,
βm′′ < |S ∩A| − |S ∩B| = m′′ − |A \ S| − |S \A| = m′′ − dH(S,A).
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For a ∈ {0, 1}, we define a contracting procedure cona : 2[m′′]×{0,1} → {0, 1}m′′ that takes a set S ⊆
C ≃ [m′′] × {0, 1} and produces the following m′′-bit string y = cona(S): If (i, 0) /∈ S and (i, 1) ∈ S then
yi = 0. If (i, 0) ∈ S and (i, 1) /∈ S then yi = 1. Otherwise, yi = a. Note that considering the expansion
procedure above, cona(exp(y)) = y for any y ∈ {0, 1}m′′ and a ∈ {0, 1}. However, some subsets of C are not
the expansion image exp(y) of any y ∈ {0, 1}m′′. We now need the following simple claim:
Claim 3.6. If A = exp(y) and dH(S,A) < (1−β)m′′ then there exists a ∈ {0, 1} such that dH(cona(S), cona(A)) <
(1− β)m′′2 .
Proof. Consider a pair of elements (i, 0), (i, 1). Since we assume A = exp(y), A contains exactly one of the
two elements. If S ∩ {(i, 0), (i, 1)} = A ∩ {(i, 0), (i, 1)}, then cona(S) and cona(A) will agree in the i-th bit,
regardless of a. If S contains one of these elements and not the same one as A, then cona(S) and cona(A) will
disagree in the i-the bit, regardless of a. If S contains both or neither element, then cona(S) and cona(A)
agree in the i-bit for one of the values a = 0 or a = 1, and not for the other. In summary, two disagreements
between S and A translate to one bit of disagreement after applying cona, and one disagreement between
S and A translates to a bit with 12 probability of disagreement (in expectation over choosing a ∈ {0, 1} at
random). Thus the claim must hold for some value of a.
To complete the proof, we observe that if x is a satisfying assignment to the formula φ, A = exp(E(x)) and
dH(con
a(S), E(x)) = dH(con
a(S), cona(A)) < (1− β)m′′2 then the list-decoding property of the code implies
that the unique satisfying assignment x must be one of the polynomially many strings that D(cona(S))
returns. We can check if x is one of the strings of D(cona(S)) simply by testing the satisfiability of each of
the assignments that D(cona(S)) returns, for each of the two possible values of a. If none of the assignments
is satisfying, we know that S is balanced with respect to (A,B) and we do not need the knowledge of the
partition (A,B) to compute vC,φ,α,β(S) = f¯C,α(S). If we find the partition (A,B), computing vC,φ,α,β(S) =
fA,B,α,β(S) is straightforward.
The formal proof of computational hardness for combinatorial auctions with these valuations can be
found in Appendix A.
4 Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms for Exact Coverage CPP
We now turn our attention to combinatorial public projects with coverage valuation. A coverage valuation is
defined as follows: there exists a universe U , and each item of the auction j ∈M is identified with a subset
Sj ⊆ U . Now we define the valuation v as v(S) = ∪j∈SSj.
Theorem 4.1. Unless NP ⊆ P/poly, there is no constant-factor truthful-in-expectation approximation for
the exact CPP problem with coverage valuations, even for 1 bidder (i.e. the problem max{f(S) : |S| = k}
where f is a coverage function).
Let us point out some aspects of this result and put it in context. For (exact) CPP a significant gap
in approximability between truthful vs. non-truthful mechanisms was proved in [20]. In particular, this
separation was proved for deterministic mechanisms and the class of submodular functions. The proof
followed the characterize and optimize approach, involving a characterization of all deterministic truthful
mechanisms and then a bound of VCG-based mechanisms by an application of the Sauer-Shelah lemma. The
proof was subsequently simplified in [2], where it was proved that no deterministic truthful mechanism can
achieve a m1/2−ǫ-approximation for coverage functions (a subclass of submodular functions), still relying the
Sauer-Shelah lemma.
Our result rules out not only deterministic but also randomized truthful-in-expectationmechanisms. While
the previous proofs can be extended to universally truthful mechanisms quite easily, truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms maybe more powerful in this setting. In particular, [10] proved that the flexible CPP problem,
where a mechanism is allowed to return a set S of size at most k, admits a truthful-in-expectation (1− 1/e)-
approximation for coverage functions. Therefore, we are right on the boundary between tractable and
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intractable problems, in terms of truthfulness in expectation. The first hardness for truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms has been obtained only recently, in the value oracle model (for the exact CPP problem in [4],
for the flexible CPP problem and combinatorial auctions in [12]). Here we prove a computational hardness
result, for the natural class of coverage valuations.
Proof overview. Our proof is very simple, directly from the hardness of Max k-cover, using an argument
somewhat similar to [12]. In particular, we do not use the Sauer-Shelah lemma or any similar combinatorial
tool. The proof follows an outline somewhat similar to [12]; it is easier to explain if we assume that the
mechanism is maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR), or in other words that all prices are equal to 0. Then,
the mechanism must maximize over a certain range of distributions R. Suppose the mechanism provides a
c-approximation. First, we prove that for every set A of size k, the range R must contain a distribution that
takes at least a c-fraction of A in expectation - this follows directly from the property of c-approximation.
Therefore, if we run M on an instance of Max k-cover that that has a hidden optimal solution of size k, the
range contains a solution that is somewhat correlated with the optimal solution. Therefore, optimizing over
the range will reveal whether the optimum is “high” or “low”.
We remark that [12] proves that every truthful-in-expectation mechanism can be replaced by an (approx-
imately) maximal-in-distributional-range mechanism. However, this reduction involves a non-uniform step
that causes problems in the setting of computational complexity, because [12] does not give any bound on
the size of the non-uniform advice that would be needed. Therefore, we deal with truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms directly here, without appealing to this reduction.
Proof. Assume that M is a truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the problem max{f(S) : |S| = k}, where
f is a coverage function. Let m denote the size of the ground set. First consider what happens when we
run the mechanism on the input f(S) = |S ∩ A| where A is some set of size k (f can be easily represented
as a coverage function). M returns a distribution DA over sets of size k, and a price pA ≥ 0. Due to the
approximation guarantee,
ER∼DA [|R ∩A|] ≥ ck.
We also note that the price pA returned by the mechanism should have bit representation polynomial in m,
since the polynomial is polynomial-time. We denote by
pm =
1(
m
k
) ∑
|A|=k
pA
the average price over all sets A of size k. This number still has a bit representation polynomial in n.
Now we describe how to solve the Max k-cover decision problem for ǫ = Ω(c2), using the mechanism
M (and polynomial advice, namely the number pn). Consider an instance of the Max k-cover problem on
universe U , with the sets indexed by M and denoted by Se, e ∈M . By examining Feige’s reduction [14], we
can see that in the YES case, there are k sets covering the entire universe. Moreover, each element of the
universe is covered by the same number of sets in the instance; let’s call it d. The total number of sets is dk.
Let π : M → M be a random permutation of the set M . We let f(T ) = pm|
⋃
e∈π(T ) Se| be the input
valuation to the mechanism. We claim the following: If we start from a YES instance, then the mechanism
returns a distribution D such that ER∼D[f(R)] ≥ (1− 1/e+2ǫ)pm|U |. If we start from a NO instance, then
the mechanism returns a distribution D such that ER∼D[f(R)] ≤ (1 − 1/e + ǫ)pm|U |. We can distinguish
these two cases probabilistically by running the mechanism repeatedly, with the advice pm. This would
imply that NP ⊆ BPP/poly = P/poly.
In the case of NO instance, the proof is simple: There is no collection of k sets covering more than a
(1 − 1/e + ǫ)-fraction of the universe. This means that f(T ) ≤ (1 − 1/e + ǫ)pm|U | for every |T | = k, in
particular for any solution returned by the mechanism.
Now suppose the Max k-cover instance is a YES instance. In this case there is a choice of k sets that
cover the universe, i.e. a set A ⊂M such that f(π−1(A)) = pm|U |. We feed f as input into the mechanism.
Recall that we shuffle the elements by a random permutation π, so the actual location of the optimal set
is random from the point of view of the mechanism. However, for any particular set A′, |A′| = k, there is
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a distribution DA′ possibly returned by the mechanism that takes at least a c-fraction of A
′ on average.
We can condition on π(A) = A′, and the elements outside of A′ are still randomly shuffled. WLOG we
can actually assume A′ = A. Let us compute what expected value this distribution gives in terms of the
objective function f :
ER∼D(A)[f(R)] = pmER∼D(A)[
⋃
e∈π(R)
Se].
Note that R takes at least ck elements from A, and the remaining elements are taken randomly from the
complement of A. In terms of the Max k-cover instance, this means that we take c′k sets from the optimal
solution (E[c′] ≥ c), and (1−c′)k sets from outside of A. Condition also on the number c′. Due to the random
shuffle, every choice of (1−c′)k sets from outside of A has the same probability. Since the total number of sets
is dk, this means that each set outside of A is taken with probability (1− c)/d. The negative correlations in
the appearance of different sets can only help in terms of coverage probability; hence we can assume that the
sets appear independently with probability (1−c′)/d. Since each element not covered by ⋃e∈A Se appears in
d−1 sets outside of S, this means that R covers it with probability at least 1− (1− (1−c′)/d)d−1 ≃ 1−ec′−1
(since d will be a very large constant in the reduction). Therefore, we obtain
ER∼D(A)[f(R)] ≥ pm(c′ + (1− c′)(1 − ec
′−1))|U |.
This is a convex function of c′ which is equal to (1− 1/e)pm|U | at c′ = 0 and equal to pm|U | at c′ = 1. For
small c′ > 0, it behaves like (1− 1/e+Θ(c′2))pm|U |. Since E[c′] ≥ c, due to convexity the worst case occurs
when c′ is actually deterministic and equal to c. Therefore, for ǫ = Θ(c2) with a suitable constant, we will
get E[f(R)] ≥ (1− 1/e+ 3ǫ)pm|U |.
By averaging over the random permutations π, we still get that the mechanism returns a solution of
expected value at least (1 − 1/e+ 3ǫ)pm|U |, and the average price is pm. Therefore, the average utility (=
expected value minus price) of this solution is at least (1− 1/e+3ǫ)pm|U |− pm ≥ (1− 1/e+2ǫ)pm|U | (since
|U | → ∞).
The final argument is as follows. If there is a distribution of expected utility at least (1− 1/e+2ǫ)pm|U |
that the mechanism could possibly return on a certain input, by truthfulness in expectation this means that
on the true input the mechanism must return a solution of expected utility at least (1 − 1/e + 2ǫ)pm|U |.
The price cannot be negative due to individual rationality, hence the expected value of the returned solution
must be at least (1 − 1/e+ 2ǫ)pm|U |. This concludes the proof.
5 Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions
In a multi-unit auctions we have m identical items and n bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function
vi : [m] → R. We use the standard assumptions that the valuations are monotone and that vi(0) =
0. The goal is to approximate the social welfare in time that is polynomial in n and logm. In [5] a
truthful-in-expectation FPTAS for this problem was given, by constructing a maximal in distributional
range algorithm. Furthermore, they show that if we there are two bidders and we require that the mechanism
either always allocate all items or not allocate any item at all, then no universally truthful mechanism can
provide an approximation ratio better than 2, but a simple adaption of the MIDR FPTAS is still a truthful-
in-expectation FPTAS even for this restricted setting. The following theorem shows that the option to
sometimes not allocate any item at all is crucial for obtaining good approximations using MIDR algorithms.
Theorem 5.1. Let A be an MIDR algorithm for multi-unit auctions with two bidders that always allocates
all items and runs in time poly(logm). Then the approximation ratio of A is no better than 12 + ǫ, unless
RP = NP .
Proof. We consider the following class of valuations that contains two types of valuations. The first type is
single minded valuations: a valuation v is called single minded when there exists some number r such that
for every r′ ≥ r we have that v(r′) = 1, and for every r′ < r we have that v(r′) = 0. The second type
15
contains a valuation vφ for every SAT formula φ with logm variables: vf (s) = 2 · s+φ(s). That is, the value
for the bundle of s items is 2 · s, and a “bonus” of 1 if s (viewed as a {0, 1}logm string and interpreted as
an assignment to the variables) satisfies φ. Notice that both types of valuations can be easily described in
O(logm) space in the natural way.
Lemma 5.2. Let (x,m − x) be an allocation. Then, there is a distribution D in the range such that D
outputs (x,m− x) with probability at least 2ǫ.
Proof. Consider the instance where both players are single minded as follows: Bidder 1 has a value of 1 for
x items or more and 0 for less than x items, and Bidder 2 has a value of 1 for m−x items or more otherwise
his value is zero. Observe that all allocations except (x,m − x) has a welfare of 1, and that (x,m − x) has
a welfare of 2. So to obtain an approximation ratio of at least 12 + ǫ (that is, to output a distribution with
an expected welfare of 1 + 2ǫ), the distribution that A outputs must have (x,m − x) in its support with
probability at least 2ǫ.
Consider the instance where one bidder has a valuation vφ, for some φ, and the other one has a valuation
uφ′ where φ
′ is not satisfied by any assignment, i.e., u(s) = 2 · s. Suppose that φ has a satisfying assignment
x. Notice that every allocation that corresponds to a satisfying assumption has a welfare of 2m+ 1 and all
other allocations have welfare of 2m (this is where the irremovable assumption that all items are allocated).
From that and from the lemma, we have that there exists a distribution in the range that has an expected
value of at least 2m+ 2ǫ, and therefore the MIDR mechanism must return a distribution with at least that
value. This implies that in the distribution that the algorithm outputs an allocation that corresponds to
a satisfying assignment is returned with probability at least 2ǫ. Now we can run A several times until it
outputs an allocation with value 2m+ 1 and find a satisfying assignment to the SAT formula φ.
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A Appendix for Section 3
A.1 The Basic Instance
Here we describe the basic instance which is the starting point of our proof. This is identical to the basic
instance in [13] and hence we only summarize the definition and state the lemma that we need without
proof. Note that the parameters are somewhat different from [13], because of considerations arising in the
next section.
Basic instance We construct instances with n players and m items, where n = 2ℓ, m = m02
ℓ (m0 → ∞
and ℓ is constant). In the basic random instance, player i has a polar additive valuation vi(S) = vA(0)i ,ω
(S) =
|S ∩A(0)i |+ ω|S \A(0)i |, where A(0)i is a uniformly random set of m0 = m/n items, chosen independently for
each player. The following lemma is proved in [13].
Lemma A.1. For any c-approximation mechanism applied to the basic random instance, there is a player
i and sets A
(0)
j , j 6= i, such that conditioned on the desired sets for players j 6= i being A(0)j , player i gets
allocated a random set R
(0)
i such that
E[|R(0)i ∩ A(0)i |] > (c/4− ω)E[|R(0)i ∪ A(0)i |].
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A.2 Setup for Higher-Level Valuations
In the following, the valuations of all players except i are fixed to be vj = vA(0)j ,ω
for the choice of sets
A
(0)
j , j 6= i given by Lemma A.1, and a parameter ω > 0 to be fixed later. We will vary only the valuation
of player i who will be referred to as the special player. Since we work only with player i, we drop the index
i in the following. We consider the following random sequence of sets of items.
Definition A.2. A random bisection sequence of a random sequence of pairs of sets (A(0), B(0)), (A(1), B(1)),
. . ., (A(ℓ), B(ℓ)), generated as follows. We define A(ℓ) = B(ℓ) = M , the set of all items. Given A(j) for
0 < j ≤ ℓ, we generate (A(j−1), B(j−1)) uniformly at random among all partitions of A(j) into two parts of
equal size.
Observe that for each j, (A(j), B(j)) is just a pair of random disjoint sets of size 2j−ℓm. However, the
correlation between sets at different levels will be also important. We refer to A(j) = A(j−1) ∪B(j−1) as the
j-th level of the bisection sequence.
For each pair of sets (A(j−1), B(j−1)) and parameters α, β > 0, we consider the valuation function
fA(j−1),B(j−1),α,β, encoded on the input as vA(j),φ,α,β for some particular ordering of A
(j) (see Section 3.1).
Recall that this is the double-peak submodular function where A(j−1) and B(j−1) are the two desired sets
of items.
Density menu Recall that according to the taxation principle, if the special player i reports valuation vi,
the mechanism must allocate to him a distribution over sets and prices of optimal expected utility out of all
the distributions potentially allocated under some reported valuation. The menu is the collection of all such
possible distributions (given fixed valuations for all other players). Similarly to [13], we replace the menu
here by an object that instead of the full distributions contains only the information relevant to us, namely
the “density” of a random set from the distribution, restricted to the set of relevant items A(j). We call this
object the “density menu”.
Definition A.3. Given a mechanism, a special player, and fixed valuations for the other players, the “density
menu of level j”, Mj, is a collection of probability distributions over R2 (pairs of real numbers), defined as
follows: The distribution of a pair of random variables (Xj , Pj) is in Mj, if (Xj , Pj) can be generated as
Xj =
|A(j) ∩R(A(j))|
|A(j)| ,
Pj = P (A
(j)),
where A(j) is a uniformly random set of 2j−ℓm items, and (R(A), P (A)) is a random (set, price) pair allocated
by the mechanism to the special player for some reported valuation vA depending on A.
In other words, Xj is the (random) fraction of the desired items that the special player can potentially
receive at level j, and Pj is the respective price. Note that there are two sources of randomness in (Xj , Pj):
the random choice of A(j), and the randomness in the distribution returned by the mechanism for a fixed
valuation vA. We illustrate this by an example:
• Consider m = 4 and ℓ = 1; A(0) is a uniformly random set of 2 elements out of 4.
• Suppose that for each pair A, there is a valuation v′A such that the special player reporting v′A receives
a (deterministic) set R(A) such that |A ∩R(A)| = 1, at a price of 500. This means that M0 contains
a distribution such that (X0, P0) = (1/2, 500) with probability 1.
• Suppose that for another choice of v′′A for each pair A, the special player receives a random set R(A)
such that |A ∩ R(A)| = 0 and the price is 0, or |A ∩ R(A)| = 2 and the price is 1000, each with
prob. 1/2. Then M0 contains a distribution such that (X0, P0) = (0, 0) or (X0, P0) = (1, 1000), each
with prob. 1/2.
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• Finally, consider the choice of v′A for half of the choices of A, and v′′A for another half of the choices of
A. Whenever reporting v′A, the player receives 1 element of A at a price of 500. When reporting v
′′
A,
he receives 0 or 2 with probability 1/2, at a price of 0 or 1000. Overall, he receives 0 elements from
A with probability 1/4, 1 element with probability 1/2, and 2 elements with probability 1/4. Hence,
M0 also contains the distribution (X0, P0) = (0, 0) with probability 1/4, (1, 500) with probability 1/2
and (2, 1000) with probability 1/4.
Closure of a density menu Furthermore, it will be convenient to make the menu closed and convex as
follows.
Definition A.4. We define Mj, the closure of the density menu at level j, to be the topological closure of
the set of all convex combinations of distributions from the menu Mj.
To avoid confusion, we emphasize that the convex combinations occur in the space of distributions,
i.e. they are obtained by averaging probabilities of each possible outcome, and not the values of (Xj , Pj). A
distribution of (Xj , Pj) is in Mj, if its distribution can be approximated arbitrarily closely by some convex
combination of distributions in Mj.
A.3 The Main Reduction
The oracle hardness proof in [13] relies on the fact that a mechanism bounded by a polynomial number of
value queries to a valuation fA,B,α,β cannot identify the two sets A,B and with high probability returns
a distribution that is balanced with respect to these two sets. Then, this argument is harnessed to show
that at each successive level, the mechanism must contain distributions in the menu that are in some sense
more valuable than at the previous level. We call this the density-boosting property. Eventually, the density-
boosting property leads to a contradiction with truthfulness at the last level.
Here, we use this argument differently: We argue that unless a contradiction with truthfulness occurs at
the last level, there must be a pair of successive levels where the density-boosting property is violated. This
allows us to find parameters for embedding the Unique-SAT problem in our instance and solving it using the
presumed mechanism. The fact that the density-boosting property is violated at some level follows directly
from [13]; but we need to prove a little bit more, namely that the parameters describing the violation can be
encoded succinctly by polynomially many bits. The precise statement that we want to prove is the following.
Definition A.5. For a parameter α > 0, define ψα(x) = min{x/α, 1}.
Lemma A.6. There are absolute constants γ, ǫ > 0 such that the following holds. Consider a (1 − ǫ)-
approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations, n =
2ℓ players and m = m02
ℓ items (for some constant ℓ and arbitrary m0), providing a c-approximation in social
welfare for c = 2−γℓ. Then there is j ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ− 1} and parameters α > 0, λ ∈ [ 12ℓ , 10ℓ(m+ 2)], described
by polynomially many bits such that there is a pair of random variables (Xj , Pj) with a distribution in the
menu closure Mj, and for every (Xj+1, Pj+1) with distribution in Mj+1, we have
E[λ(1 − (1− ψα(Xj+1))2)− Pj+1] + 1
4ℓ
< (1− ǫ)E[λψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]−E[Pj ].
Assuming this lemma, we finish the proof of Theorem 3.2 as follows.
of Theorem 3.2. Assume that there is a (1 − ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-expectation n−γ-approximation
for combinatorial auctions with n bidders and valuations of the type described above (polar and double-peak
valuations). We can assume w.l.o.g. that n = 2ℓ (otherwise let us prove the theorem for the nearest power
of 2, and adjust γ accordingly). We are given a Unique-SAT formula φ on m′ variables and we generate an
instance of combinatorial auctions that will enable us to solve the Unique-SAT instance. We also describe
an advice string depending only on the size of the formula, which will be needed to complete the reduction.
We set β = 10−ℓ and m = nm′′ = 2ℓm′′, where m′′ = poly(m′) are the parameters of an (m′′,m′, 12 (1 −
β)m′′)-list-decodable code. Let j be the level provided by Lemma A.6 for n players and m items. If j > 0,
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we adjust the code by duplicating each bit of a codeword 2j times, so that codewords have length 2j−ℓm.
The double-peak valuations using this code are then defined on a support of size 2j+1−ℓm, which is what we
need at level j.
For players i′ 6= i, let their true valuations be the polar valuations vAi′ ,ω, i′ 6= i guaranteed by Lemma A.1.
(These sets depend only on the size of the instance and hence can be given as part of the advice string.)
For player i, let the true valuation be λvC,φ,α,β where C is a randomly ordered random set of 2m
′′ = 2j−ℓm
items, and j, α, λ are the parameters given by Lemma A.6. Again, these parameters as well as β are part of
the advice string. (λv denotes multiplication of a valuation function pointwise by a scalar λ.) We run the
mechanism with C and its ordering randomly chosen, and all calculations will be in expectation over this
random choice.
Now, if φ is a satisfiable formula, we denote by (A,B) the partition of C corresponding to the (unique)
satisfiable assignment. Then the valuation is λvC,φ,α,β = λfA,B,α,β. Recall the definition of fA,B,α,β(S) =
ψ˜(x, y) from Section 3.1, using the variables x = |S∩A||A| and y =
|S∩B|
|B| , and observe that in all cases,
λvC,φ,α,β(S) = λψ˜(x, y) ≥ λψ˜(x, 0) ≥ λmin
{
x− β
α
, 1
}
= λψα(x− β).
Due to C and its ordering being chosen randomly, (A,B) is distributed uniformly over all pairs of disjoint
sets of size 2j−ℓm. In particular, the set A is a uniformly random set of size 2j−ℓm. By the definition of
a density menu Mj (Definition A.3), if a pair of random variables (Xj , Pj) has a distribution in Mj, it
means that there are valuations vA that player i could declare, depending on A, such that the fraction of
A that he receives is given by the random variable Xj , and the price he is charged is Pj . Considering the
above description of player i’s true valuation, where the fraction of A received is denoted by x = |S∩A||A| , the
respective utility that the special player obtains from such a distribution is at least
U = E[λψα(Xj − β)− Pj ] = E[λψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)− Pj ].
We remark that since this expected utility is achieved by a distribution in the menu closure Mj , at least
the same expected utility (or arbitrarily close) can be achieved also by a distribution on the menu Mj itself
(using the fact that taking convex combinations of distributions of Xj results in convex combinations of
expected values, of any function of Xj). By the property of approximate truthfulness in expectation, if
utility at least U can be achieved for some valuation possibly declared by the player, then utility at least
(1− ǫ)U ≥ (1− ǫ)E[λψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]−E[Pj ] must be achieved when declaring the true valuation λvC,φ,α,β .
Observe that this is the right-hand side of the inequality in Lemma A.6.
Now consider the random set R that the player i actually receives when declaring the true valuation
λvC,φ,α,β . We claim that this set must be at least sometimes significantly unbalanced with respect to the
partition (A,B). Namely, we claim
Pr
[ |R ∩ A|
|A| −
|R ∩B|
|B| ∈ [−β,+β]
]
< 1− 1
4ℓλ
. (1)
Assume for a contradiction that |R∩A||A| − |R∩B||B| ∈ [−β,+β] with probability at least 1 − 14ℓλ . As before, we
denote x = |R∩A||A| and y =
|R∩B|
|B| . When x − y ∈ [−β,+β], we have by the construction of the valuation
vC,φ,α,β,
vC,φ,α,β(R) = 1−
(
1− x+ y
2α
)2
+
= 1−
(
1− |R ∩ C|
α|C|
)2
+
= 1− (1− ψα (Xj+1))2
where Xj+1 =
|R∩C|
|C| . When |x − y| > β, the value vC,φ,α,β(R) can increase, compared to this formula, by
no more than 1. Since this happens with probability at most 14ℓλ , we get
E[vC,φ,α,β(R)] ≤ E[1− (1− ψα (Xj+1))2] + 1
4ℓλ
.
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The expectation here is over C, its ordering and the randomness in R. By the definition of level-(j+1) menu
(Definition A.3), the menuMj+1 contains the distribution of the pair (Xj+1, Pj+1) where Xj+1 = |R∩C||C| and
Pj+1 is the respective random price that player i is charged. By the above inequality, the utility of player i
when declaring his true valuation is
E[λvC,φ,α,β(R)− Pj+1] ≤ λE[λ(1 − (1− ψα (Xj+1))2)− Pj+1] + 1
4ℓ
.
However, Lemma A.6 states that for any distribution in Mj+1 (even in Mj+1),
E[λ(1 − (1− ψα(Xj+1))2)− Pj+1] + 1
4ℓ
< (1− ǫ)E[λψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]−E[Pj ] ≤ (1 − ǫ)U .
Recall we proved that the right-hand side is a lower bound on the utility that player i receives when declaring
his true valuation. This is a contradiction which proves (1).
Therefore, with probability at least 14ℓλ , the returned set R satisfies
|R∩A|
|A| − |R∩B||B| /∈ [−β,+β]. But
once we find such a set (by running the mechanism polynomially many times, this will happen with high
probability), we can determine the partition of C into (A,B) by decoding the set R ∩ C using the list-
decodable code, and checking whether any of the decoded strings x is a satisfying assignment to the formula
φ. In conclusion, we solve the Unique-SAT problem and hence also the SAT problem (by a randomized
reduction) in RP/poly = P/poly.
A.4 Proof of Lemma A.6
In this section, we prove Lemma A.6, which completes the proof. This lemma relies on the density-boosting
technique of [13]. In particular, we appeal to the following technical lemma proved in [13]. The content
of this lemma is a boosting argument about distributions at different levels that leads to an exponential
blow-up in terms of density.
Lemma A.7. There are absolute constants ǫ, δ > 0 such that the following holds for any sufficiently large
ℓ ∈ N. If X0, . . . ,Xℓ are collections of random variables in [0, 1] such that
• there is X0 in X0 such that E[X0] ≥ c for some c ≥ 2−ℓ, and
• for every Xj in Xj and for every function of the form ψα(t) = min
{
t
α , 1
}
, α ∈ [δℓ/2, 1], there is Xj+1
in Xj+1 such that
E[1− (1− ψα(Xj+1))2] ≥ (1− ǫ)E[ψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]− 10−ℓ
then there is a sequence of variables Xj in Xj and parameters 1 = α0 ≥ α1 ≥ . . . αℓ ≥ δℓ/2 such that for
each j = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ,
αj(E[ψαj (Xj)])
1+δ ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)j
c1+δ.
We remark that instead of “for every function of the form ψα(t) = min
{
t
α , 1
}
”, the assumption in [13]
is formulated as “for every non-decreasing concave function”. However, the only non-decreasing concave
functions that are used in the proof are of the form above. Also, the possible parameters α arising in the
proof are in the interval [δℓ/2, 1], because α0 = 1 and in each step α can decrease by at most a factor of
√
δ.
Therefore Lemma A.7 follows from the proof in [13].
Using this lemma, we first prove the following as a stepping stone towards Lemma A.6.
Lemma A.8. There are absolute constants γ, δ, ǫ > 0 such that the following holds. Consider a (1 − ǫ)-
approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations, n =
2ℓ players and m = m02
ℓ items (for some constant ℓ and arbitrary m0), providing a c-approximation in social
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welfare for c = 2−γℓ. Then there is j ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ− 1} and a parameter α ∈ [δℓ/2, 1] described by polynomially
many bits such that the menu closure Mj contains a distribution of a pair (Xj , Pj) such that E[Pj ] ≤ m+1,
and for every (Xj+1, Pj+1) with a distribution in Mj+1, either
E[1− (1− ψα(Xj+1))2] < (1 − ǫ)E[ψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]− 10−ℓ
or
E[Pj+1] > E[Pj ] +
1
ℓ
.
Proof. Let ǫ, δ > 0 be the constants provided by Lemma A.7. We define γ = δ
2
2(1+δ) . Assume to the contrary
that we have a (1− ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for n = 2ℓ players, m = m02ℓ items,
providing a c = 2−γℓ-approximation in social welfare. In addition, for every j ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ − 1}, α ∈ [δℓ/2, 1]
and every distribution (Xj , Pj) in Mj, with E[Pj ] ≤ m + 1, there is a distribution (Xj+1, Pj+1) in Mj+1
such that
E[1− (1− ψα(Xj+1))2] ≥ (1 − ǫ)E[ψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]− 10−ℓ
and
E[Pj+1] ≤ E[Pj ] + 1
ℓ
.
We start from the basic instance (Section A.1), where we set ω = c/8. According to Lemma A.1, we
choose a special player and fix the valuations of the other players. Let R(0) be the random set allocated to
the special player, P0 the respective price, A
(0) his desired set, X0 =
|R(0)∩A(0)|
|A(0)|
, c0 = E[X0] and p0 = E[P0].
Lemma A.1 implies c0 ≥ c/4−ω = c/8 = 2−γℓ−3. Observe also that p0 cannot be very large due to individual
rationality: valuations in the basic instance are bounded by m, so we have p0 ≤ m.
Now let us consider the density menu at different levels and their closures Mj (Section A.2). We define
Xj to be the collection of random variables Xj such that (Xj , Pj) is in Mj for some price Pj such that
E[Pj ] ≤ p0 + jℓ . As discussed above, we have X0 in X0 such that E[X0] = c0 ≥ 2−γℓ−3 ≥ 2−ℓ for γℓ
sufficiently large (which can be assumed, because this corresponds to the approximation factor c = 2−γℓ
being sufficiently small).
By our assumption by contradiction (beginning of proof), the collections X0,X1, . . . ,Xℓ satisfy the as-
sumptions of the technical Lemma A.7. (Note that prices can increase by 1/ℓ in each step, which is consistent
with our definition of Xj .) Consequently, the lemma implies that there is a random variable Xℓ in the col-
lection Xℓ and αℓ ∈ [δℓ/2, 1] such that
αℓ(E[ψαℓ(Xℓ)])
1+δ ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)ℓ
c1+δ0 .
Recall that ψαℓ(t) = min{ tαℓ , 1}. Therefore,
E[Xℓ] ≥ αℓE[ψαℓ(Xℓ)] ≥ α(E[ψαℓ(Xℓ)])1+δ ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)ℓ
c1+δ0 ≥ 2δ
2ℓ−ℓc1+δ0 .
Since Xℓ is in Xℓ, the respective price is bounded by E[Pℓ] ≤ p0+ 1. Now consider the following expression:
E[ωmXℓ − Pℓ] ≥ ωm2δ2ℓ−ℓc1+δ0 − p0 − 1.
The distribution of (Xℓ, Pℓ) is in the menu closureMℓ; recall that this involves taking convex combinations
and limits of distributions on the actual menu Mℓ. Therefore, a slightly weaker linear equality must be
satisfied by some pair (X˜ℓ, P˜ℓ) with a distribution on the actual menu Mℓ:
E[ωmX˜ℓ − P˜ℓ] ≥ ωm2δ2ℓ−ℓc1+δ0 − p0 − 2.
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Recall that being on the menu Mℓ means that X˜ℓ = |R˜
(ℓ)|
|A(ℓ)|
= 1m |R˜(ℓ)|, where R˜(ℓ) is a random set allocated
to the special player for a certain valuation at level ℓ. Consider now what would happen if the special player
reports this level-ℓ valuation in the basic instance (where his true valuation is a polar one, vA(0),ω(S) =
|S ∩ Ai|+ ω|S \Ai|). He would receive expected utility
E[vAi,ω(R˜
(ℓ))− P˜ℓ] ≥ E[ω|R˜(ℓ)| − P˜ℓ] ≥ E[ωmX˜ℓ − P˜ℓ] ≥ ωm2δ2ℓ−ℓc1+δ0 − p0 − 2.
Using c0 ≥ c/8 = 2−γℓ−3, we get
E[vA(0),ω(R˜
(ℓ))− P˜ℓ] ≥ ωm2δ
2ℓ−ℓc1+δ0 − p0 − 2 ≥ 2δ
2ℓ−(1+δ)(γℓ+3)m0c0 − p0 − 2.
Since we chose γ = δ
2
2(1+δ) , this means
E[vA(0),ω(R˜
(ℓ))− P˜ℓ] ≥ 2δ2ℓ/2−3(1+δ)m0c0 − p0 − 2. (2)
On the other hand, the set R(0) actually allocated under declared valuation vA(0),ω gives
E[vA(0),ω(R
(0))] = E[|R(0) ∩A(0)|] + ωE[|R(0) \A(0)|] ≤ m
n
E[X0] + ωE[|R(0)|] ≤ 2m
n
E[X0]
using again Lemma A.1 to say that mn E[X0] = E[|R(0) ∩A(0)|] ≥ (c/4−ω)E[|R(0)|] = ωE[|R(0)|]. Therefore,
since E[X0] = c0 and E[P0] = p0],
E[vA(0),ω(R
(0))− P0] ≤ 2m
n
E[X0]−E[P0] = 2m0c0 − p0. (3)
Comparing (2) and (3), we see that for sufficiently large m0 and ℓ, the special player is significantly better
off reporting a level-ℓ valuation that gives him the random set R˜(ℓ) at a price P˜ℓ, rather than reporting his
true valuation vA(0),ω. This would violate the assumption of (1− ǫ)-approximate truthfulness in expectation.
Therefore, we have proved the lemma by contradiction.
Now we are almost done - we just have to use Lemma A.8 in order to prove Lemma A.6. This is essentially
a convex separation argument in the plane: we want to turn two separation inequalities for a convex set into
one inequality. However, some technicalities arise because of the requirement that the separating inequality
should be described by a polynomial number of bits.
of Lemma A.6. Assume that we have a mechanism as described in the lemma. These are the same conditions
that we assume in Lemma A.8. Lemma A.8 implies that there is j ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ − 1} and a parameter
α ∈ [δℓ/2, 1] described by polynomially many bits such that the menu closure Mj contains a distribution
(Xj , Pj) such that for every distribution (Xj+1, Pj+1) in Mj+1 either
E[1− (1− ψα(Xj+1))2] < (1 − ǫ)E[ψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]− 10−ℓ
or
E[Pj+1] > E[Pj ] +
1
ℓ
.
Define
Qj+1 = {(E[1− (1 − ψα(Xj+1))2],E[Pj+1]) : (Xj+1, Pj+1) ∈ Mj}.
Then Qj+1 is a closed convex set in the plane, because taking convex combinations of distributions of
(Xj+1, Pj+1) corresponds to taking convex combinations of the respective points in the plane. Moreover, by
the above Qj+1 is disjoint from the closed convex set
Rj = {(q, p) : 1 ≥ q ≥ (1− ǫ)E[ψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]− 10−ℓ, 0 ≤ p ≤ E[Pj ] + 1
ℓ
}.
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Next, we replace Rj by a subset R′j ⊂ Rj , which is defined as follows:
R′j = {(q, p) : q ≤ 1, p ≥ 0,
1
2ℓ
(q − (1 − ǫ)E[ψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]) ≥ p−E[Pj ]− 1
2ℓ
,
10ℓ(m+ 2)(q − (1− ǫ)E[ψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]) ≥ p−E[Pj ]− 1
2ℓ
}.
It can be verified that R′j ⊂ Rj , using the bounds q ≤ 1 and E[Pj ] ≤ m+1: every point (q, p) satisfying the
constraints of R′j also satisfies the constraints of Rj .
Since Qj+1 is disjoint from R′j , they can be separated by a line through the point ((1 − ǫ)E[ψα(Xj −
10−ℓ)],E[Pj ]+
1
2ℓ ) which is on the boundary of R′j : there is a coefficient λ such that for each (Xj+1, Pj+1) ∈
Mj , we have
λ(E[1− (1 − ψα(Xj+1))2]− (1− ǫ)E[ψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]) < E[Pj+1]−E[Pj ]− 1
2ℓ
.
Moreover, the coefficient λ must be in the interval [ 12ℓ , 10
ℓ(m+2)], otherwise this constraint does not separate
from R′j (see the constraints defining R′j above). Finally, we round λ down to a multiple of 14ℓ , to obtain
λ′ = ⌊4ℓλ⌋ 14ℓ . Since we have |λ′ − λ| ≤ 14ℓ , the following inequality is still valid:
λ′(E[1− (1− ψα(Xj+1))2]− (1− ǫ)E[ψα(Xj − 10−ℓ)]) < E[Pj+1]−E[Pj ]− 1
4ℓ
.
As λ′ is in the form λ′ = ℓ
′
4ℓ where ℓ is a constant and ℓ
′ is an integer bounded by 4ℓ · 10ℓ(m+ 2), λ′ can be
described by a polynomial number of bits. This is the inequality claimed by Lemma A.6.
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